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The Dilemma of a Civil Libertarian: Francis Biddle 
And the Smith Act 
THOMAS L. PAHL 
Mankato State College 
ABSTRACT - Although society may have good reasons for protecting itself against both sedition 
and conspiracy, history demonstrates that statutes directed against these offenses are particularly 
prone to result in the abuse of power. A possibility of just such an abuse in the first application 
of the Smith Act - the Minneapolis Trotskyite trial of 1941 - led to a consideration of a civil 
libertarian caught in the cross-pressure of enforcing a law anathema to his professed liberal be-
liefs. The study showed that, during time of threat, internal or external, our democratic society 
permits our government officials, in the name of survival, to limit those freedoms guaranteed by 
our Constitution. 
During 1937 various individuals were expelled from 
the Socialist Party because of their revolutionary, left 
wing beliefs. These people held a convention in Chicago 
during the New Year's weekend at which the Socialist 
Worker Party was organized. This convention issued a 
Declaration of Principles and adopted a constitution. 
Thus a party organization was set up and party activi-
ties proceeded. 
The Declaration set forth the program of action to 
effectuate the overthrow of the existing capitalistic so-
ciety and the government that supported it. The first step 
was to build up strength of the party so that it could 
have a majority of the exploited classes back of its lead-
ership. The final step was to replace the existing govern-
ment, by force if necessary. 
The Party opposed Stalin and supported Trotsky and 
his program. After Trotsky arrived in Mexico, various 
leaders of the group conferred with him as to policies 
and actions, especially concerning the use of Defense 
Guards within labor unions. They were to be used for 
protection of the unions, later growing into a militia, and 
still later into a Red Army. Such a Defense Guard was 
organized in the Teamsters Local 544 at Minneapolis in 
July or August, 1938. It never realized the dreams of 
Trotsky, however. Its activities were limited to parking 
cars at the 544 annual picnic, target practice for those 
interested, and close order drill foilowed by a visit to a 
cheap strip show. 
The Party also engaged in writing, publishing, and 
disseminating publications designed to convert others to 
their program. They also encouraged members of the 
armed forces to think of their officers as tools of the ex-
isting capitalistic society and its imperialistic war-mon-
gering government. 
In December, 1940, the Party held a convention 
where, because of the Smith Act, the Declaration of 
Principles was suspended and withdrawn. This was ob-
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viously an attempt to give evidence that the Party had 
broken and abandoned the desire to use force to over-
throw the government and the advocacy of insubordi-
nation in the armed forces. 
In 1941 agents of the FBI got jobs as truck drivers 
in Minneapolis and joined Local 544 to observe its lead-
ership. In June U.S. marshals raided the headquarters 
of the Party, confiscated two bushels of paper, two red 
flags, and several pictures of Leon Trotsky. The arrest 
and trial under the Smith Act followed. 
The role of Francis Biddle in the Trotskyite trial is 
quite enigmatic. Biddle was named to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals by Franklin Roosevelt in 1939; and when 
Robert Jackson became Attorney General in 1940, 
Biddle was appointed Solicitor General. On 11 June 
1941 Jackson resigned as Attorney General to accept a 
Supreme Court position and Biddle became acting and 
later Attorney General. It was as acting Attorney Gen-
eral that Biddle authorized the criminal action against 
the Minneapolis Trotskyites. 
In an earlier symposium on civil liberties (Biddle, 
April 1941) the then Solicitor General spoke on "Gov-
ernment and Propaganda" and said that the question of 
propaganda inevitably brings into question the "circum-
stances" of the time. Biddle's consideration of circum-
stances seems to be a reflection of the fears, insecurities, 
and conflicts produced by the threat of war and the 
threat of Bolshevik Revolution. These same fears, in-
securities, and conflicts had brought about the passage 
of the Smith Act earlier in the year. 
Before the raids of the Party headquarters, Biddle had 
remarked that sedition statutes invariably had been used 
to prevent and punish criticism of the government, par-
ticularly in time of war. He believed them to be unnec-
essary and harmful and doubted whether any speech or 
writing should be made criminal. However, this skepti-
cism concerning sedition laws does not seem to square 
with public statements attributed to Biddle immediately 
following the raids. He is quoted as saying that the action 
was being taken against "persons who have engaged in 
criminal activities and have gained control of a legitimate 
labor union to use it for illegitimate purpose." (New 
Yark Times, 2 Dec. 1941 ) A local newspaper claimed 
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that the Attorney General revealed the decision to make 
these prosecutions the start of a nationwide drive on those 
regarded as dangerous radicals and Communists. The 
paper saw action by the Justice Department as "grim de-
termination" to push the case to a swift conclusion. (St. 
Paul Pioneer Press, 23 June 1941) 
Biddle was attacked immediately by the American 
Civil Liberties Union as well as by his liberal friends. 
Three days after the raids, the ACLU telegraphed acting 
Attorney General Biddle, urging reconsideration of the 
move to prosecute the SWP members. The telegram de-
clared that the government's action "is obviously dan-
gerous to the preservation of democracy" (Minneapolis 
Star Journal, 1 July 1941). A month later the ACLU 
sent another protest to Biddle, calling upon the Depart-
ment of Justice to dismiss the prosecution, claiming that 
the government injected itself into an inter-union con-
troversy in order to promote the interests of the side 
which supported the Administration's foreign and domes-
tic policy. Still later the ACLU challenged the constitu-
tionality of the injunction because it felt that the case 
had been wrongly removed from one involving expres-
sion of opinion and that the threat of force did not con-
stitute an overt act as claimed by Biddle (Minneapolis 
Star Journal, 20 October 1941). 
Liberal I. F. Stone, in an article entitled "The G-
String Conspiracy," belittled the entire action and con-
cluded by saying; 
"Without allegations as to overt acts or some clear 
and present danger," these prosecutions are prosecu-
tions of opinion. Yet Mr. Biddle and Mr. Berge were 
willing to take responsibility for them without the full 
inquiry warranted by a step so out of accord with 
our free traditions. If I understand Mr. Biddle rightly 
he thinks that a government need not wait for an 
overt act but can punish men for the probable con-
sequences which would result if they tried to put their 
ideas into action. This reasoning is no different from 
that on which Trotskyites are jailed in the Third 
Reich or the Soviet Union. On this basis, Thoreau 
could have been kept in jail for life. (The Nation, 
26 July 1941) 
Two days later the New Republic continued the at-
tack on the Attorney General, 
"That the Minneapolis case is important goes without 
saying. President Roosevelt and Acting Attorney Gen-
eral Biddle have repeatedly promised that there 
would be no such violations of civil liberties as 
stained the honor of America in the last war. For a 
country preparing to fight for the principle of de-
mocracy now to violate those principles either in 
hysterical fear of a little handful of theoretical Com-
munists, or as a part of a sordid political maneuver 
to help the AF of L and hurt the CIO would be un-
forgivable; it would be worth ten divisions to Hitler." 
( "Civil Liberties in Minneapolis," 1941) 
John Dos Passos, writing "To a Liberal in Office," in 
a letter designed to reach the sensitive ear of Roosevelt 
but applicable to Biddle as well said, 
"What I want to ask you is this; what is more dan-
gerous to that survival of the democratic process in this 
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country for which I am sure you would gladly lay 
down your life - the uprising of a few fanatics who 
control a single local of a trade union or a situation 
in which the government undermines at home those 
four freedoms for which it is asking the nation to 
make every sacrifice abroad'? ( The Nation, 6 Sep-
tember 1941) 
Biddle, apparently sensitive to the criticism of his 
liberal friends, attempted to clarify his position in the 
New York Times, 
"It seems to me that the most important job an At-
torney General can do in a time of emergency is to 
protect civil liberties. 
In times such as these a strange psychology 
grips us ... we are likely to vent our dammed up 
energy on a scapegoat . . . it may be a labor union 
which stands up for what it believes to be its rights 
. . . In so far as I can . . . I intend to see that 
civil liberties in this country are protected; that we do 
not again fall into the disgraceful hysteria of witch 
hunts, strike-breakings and minority persecutions 
which were such a dark chapter in our record of the 
last World War." (New York Times, 21 September 
1941) 
This attempt to soften the liberal critics was too much 
to swallow for George Novak, secretary of the Civil 
Rights Defense Committee. In a letter to the Times he 
pointed out that "the declaration directly conflicts with 
the prosecution initiated in Minneapolis. "Prosecutions 
speak louder than promises," he noted. (New York 
Times, 28 September 1941) 
How then does one square Biddle's skepticism about 
sedition trials with his authorization of the action against 
the Minneapolis Trotskyites? Biddle himself may have 
given the answer some eleven years later. Writing in In 
Brief Authority he says that he may have been motivated 
by the instinct to display firmness on appropriate oc-
casions. He believed that under the circumstances the 
case would be fairly tried and would not result in a spate 
of prosecutions for sedition as happened in the 1920s. He 
thought that the provisions might be declared unconstitu-
tional; and thus he authorized a prosecution so that the 
law would be tested at that threshold and taken to the 
Supreme Court where it would, he hoped and believed, 
be knocked out. Biddle claimed that he sent Henry 
Schweinhaut, formerly in charge of the Civil Liberties 
Unit of the Department of Justice, to Minneapolis to see 
that the U.S. Attorney "did not let his patriotism run 
away from him" and to say quietly to the trial judge that 
Biddle was anxious that the trial be as narrow as pos-
sible. 
Biddle felt that the trial itself was fair and took some 
solace in the fact that there were a number of acquit-
tals and that the sentences were comparatively light. In 
retrospect, he said that he regretted authorizing the pro-
secutions, 
"I should not have tried to test the criminal pro-
visions of the statute in this particular case. The two 
Dunne brothers and their twenty-seven associates 
were the leaders of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers 
Party, a little splinter group, which claimed 3,000 
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members , and by no conceivable stretch of a liberal 
imagination could have been said to constitute any 
'clear and present danger" to our government, which 
it was alleged, they were conspiring to overthrow. 
There had been no substantial overt act outside of 
talk and threats, openly expressed in the time-hon-
ored Marxist lingo." (Biddle 1962: 152) 
The refusal of the Supreme Court to review the case 
was a surprise to Biddle and he felt that the victory for 
the government became for him a personal defeat. He 
felt that the Court may have thought that the case did 
not present strong enough facts on which to test the law. 
A draft on the Minneapolis Trotskyite trial, including 
this information on Biddle, was sent in November, 1964 
to Milton Cantor, associate editor of Labor History. A 
month later Mr. Cantor wrote that he and his editorial 
board would like to publish the material. However, he 
suggested that I contact Mr. Biddle in an attempt to 
clear up some of the questions about his role in the pro-
ceedings. I wrote to Biddle and enclosed a copy of the 
draft in the hope that he would thus be able to answer 
for Mr. Cantor and myself the questions the paper rose 
about his role in the proceedings. His stinging reply 
came a few days later, 
"I have just received your letter of December 15th. 
There is no basis for your statement that my role in 
the Dunne tri al was 'quite enigmatic.' I was opposed 
to the sedition and other provisions of the Smith 
Act , and doubted their constitutionality. From this 
point of view it seemed to me wise to test them 
promptly. I therefore authorized the indictment. 
The case was tried fairly, and the sentences were 
moderate. The Circuit Court sustained the convic-
tions, and the Supreme Court refused to review, 
and a few years later held the act constitutional. 
What is there 'enigmatic' about my role? Are you 
of the opinion that I should have refused to authorize 
prosecution because I was opposed to sedition laws 
in general, and to this law in particular? Are these 
the questions that trouble you and Mr. Cantor? 
On page 17 of your article you say: 'While 
awaiting sentence Goldman still insisted that it 
remained a fact that the conspirators were Dan 
Tobin, President Roosevelt, and Attorney General 
Biddle, who had invented this frame-up for the pur-
pose of violating the will of the truckdrivers ... 
This language would seem to indicate that you be-
lieve there was such a conspirarcy, and you rely on 
the opinion of one of the convicted defendants 
to prove it. Such a conclusion is of course absurd. 
President Roosevelt never communicated with me 
about the case directly or indirectly, nor did Dan 
Tobin or any other labor representative. 
I suggest that in view of what I have said 
that you withdraw any suggestion that there was any 
'conspiracy' or 'frame-up' in connection with the 
prosecution of this case, by any branch of govern-
ment, or any individual connected with the govern-
ment." (Letter to author, 28 Dec. 1964) 
Mr. Biddle also wrote Mr. Cantor and closed with 
the comment, "I suggest that you consult your lawyer as 
to whether such a charge - conspiracy - is libelous be-
fore you print the article." My first thought was to call 
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my friend Frank Farrell, President of the Minnesota 
ACLU, and ask him to defend me against libel charges 
brought by the former President of the Americans for 
Democratic Action. The irony of that situation is quite 
evident! 
Mr. Cantor reacted negatively to the inference of pos-
sible litigation and said that he had no intention of re-
neging on his promise to publish. He suggested, however, 
that speculation about Mr. Biddle's motivation should 
be eliminated - unless it could be established that he was 
part of a conspiracy, 
. .. As it now stands, the evidence suggesting col-
lusion is inadequate. Biddle is quite right in this 
regard . The fact that the SWP made the claim can 
hardly be taken at face value without substantial 
evidence from other sources . . . 
Biddle's letter, to be sure, is fascinating - for he 
was wounded and obviously feeis some guilt. And 
when he says, "Are you of the opinion that I should 
have refused to authorize prosecution because I was 
opposed to sedition laws in general and to this law 
in particular?", the answer is clearly "Yes.'' But 
he must be given his due regarding the collusion 
charge - in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
And I am returning the enclosed to you in the hope 
that the above and my comments of January 18th 
will be seriously considered by you and result in 
some further revisions along the lines suggested ... 
(Letter to author, 22 February 1965) 
Revisions were made qualifying the original, although 
unintended, abrasive and polemical tone of the paper. 
This was done without destroying the study of the be-
havior of public officials during time of pressure. Thus 
it was shown again that, during time of threat, internal 
or external, our democratic society permits our govern-
ment officials, in the name of survival, to limit those 
freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. What is shock-
ing here is that an avowed liberal, such as Francis Biddle, 
dedicated to preserving these rights, authorized prosecu-
tion even though he was opposed to sedition laws in gen-
eral and to the Smith Act in particular. I close with a 
question. If we cannot depend on a man with Biddle's 
convictions in a circumstance such as this, where can 
we turn? 
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Findings on Disarmament 
WILLIAM 0. PETERFI 
University of Minnesota, Morris 
ABSTRACT - The author proposes a critical appraisal of current disarmament plans and their im-
plications in present international affairs, especially, the 1964 draft treaties of the United States 
and the Soviet Union calling for a general and complete disarmament. By comparing and evalu-
ating these two plans, the author hopes to prove his thesis that although disarmament is part of 
the overall peace effort, the attainment of disarmament will not necessarily establish peace. On 
the contrary, before any actual and feasible disarmament can be achieved, there must be estab-
lished a peaceful international climate conducive to a general and complete disarmament. 
Part One 
"To disarm or not to disarm," is the question that 
might rightfully be asked by a latter day political scien-
tist-, military expert-, statesman-, or just common man-
turned Hamlet. Of course, the original question posed by 
the first Hamlet, "To be or not to be," is as relevant to-
day as it was in the Shakespearean drama. Moreover, to 
many people the two questions comprise the real issue 
regarding the future of mankind: "If you do not disarm 
you simply will not be." Others would develop this idea 
to its logical conclusion by saying that mankind will not 
survive unless peace is established throughout the world 
and to establish peace the nations must disarm. Thus, the 
argument goes, disarmament is an absolute prerequisite 
to peace; there can be no peace without disarmament. 
Whether or not this line of thinking is correct is discussed 
in this paper. 1 
The scope of disarmament can be divided into two dis-
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the prospects of peace). 
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tin ct categories: first, general and complete or compre-
hensive disarmament; and second, limited arms reduction 
or control. The first category would include disarmament 
agreements involving all nations and all types of arma-
ments; nations would be permitted only very limited arms 
for the maintenance of internal order by internal security 
forces. The other form of disarmament, limited in its 
scope, would consist of attempts at local agreements be-
tween two or more nations and would include only par-
tial armaments limitations. 
In a general and complete disarmament plan, which 
would be accomplished in various stages leading from 
less to more drastic and radical measures, all nations 
would adhere to a single treaty. General and complete 
disarmament is based on the assumption that there is an 
arms race which is general in its scope 2 among the pres-
ent international community of major and lesser nations. 
Thus, since nations do not live in isolation, a military 
build-up in one country stimulates similar measures 
among its neighbors, and even the neutra1 nations have 
no choice but constantly to improve their military pos-
ture, and, as a consequence, to be drawn involuntarily 
into the arms race. Since the neutral nations are not 
members of military alliances, national self-interest and 
survival is an individual concern . Most of the present 
neutral nations have forces well beyond the level suffi-
cient for the maintenance of internal peace and security. 
It follows from this argument, therefore, that any disarm-
ament argreement to which only a few states acceed, such 
0 Ao excellent introduction to the study of disarmament and 
arms control by Bull ( 1965), establishes a general terminology 
of the various meanings of disarmament and arms control, and 
offers a theoretical analysis of the subject matter. For practical 
purposes, Professor Bull's terminology is used in the present pa~ 
per. 
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